From: Terada, Bonnie (ATG) [mailto:BonnieT@ATG.WA.GOV] Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2014 8:58 AM To: Margaret Olney Cc: Darcy Rourk; Tim Cook Subject: Files and proposal
The duplicated official personnel file was mailed overnight yesterday afternoon.
Attached is a Tenure Purchase Agreement and Settlement and Release Agreement for your client’s consideration. The May 2, 2014 date reflects 21 days from this Friday and as you are know is required by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Please let me know by 1:00 PM Friday whether Prof. Craven wishes to have the 21 days to consider the agreement. I think its best to inform Mr. Stonier by that time so he can inform the 6 faculty members and the College can inform all of their substitutes that the hearing may be rescheduled to allow for the 21 day consideration period.
Bonnie Y. Terada
Senior Counsel |Office of the Attorney General
Regional Services Division, Vancouver
1220 Main Street, Suite 510 |Vancouver, WA 98660-2964
1. $100,000 buy-out of your tenure
2. Waiver of all claims against the College (paragraphs 4 and 5)
3. Agreement not to lodge complaints against College (and its officers/employees) with any state agency (paragraph 6) ever for anything
4. Mutual agreement to not disparage the other (paragraph 7)
5. Non-disclosure of even the existence of the agreement
Thank you for putting together a settlement proposal. I have had an opportunity to review your settlement offer with my client. We are particularly concerned about the gag orders contained in the proposal. Simply put, Prof. Craven is unwilling to compromise his legal and ethical obligations to identify and report malfeasance.
Again, thank you for taking the time to make an offer.
My response (took less than 21 seconds not 21 days to consider and reject the $100,000):
Under progressive discipline, each stage, the correctness and specificity of the charges, properly heard with due process for all, with all findings properly reviewed, is a predicate for the next and higher stages of discipline. Further, in this case, with a series of outright kangaroo courts, each stage and how it was handled, is not proof of a pattern of conduct on my part with charges properly proved, but rather evidence of a pattern of conduct and mens rea on the Clark College that amounts not only to a cornucopia of torts, but of crimes as well.
If I were to even entertain this this “settlement offer”, I would, in my opinion as a citizen required to be able to read, understand and comport myself with the law, with the law being required to be specific in terms and meanings and understandable by an average reasonable and prudent person, be guilty of taking money and benefits to aid and abet the covering-up of real crimes causing real harm to real people; I would also be derelict in my duty as a public employee; I would also be complicit in future damages and harm to innocents by aiding in the cover-up and keeping in place individuals I know from their conduct alone, are unfit to be in any kind of position of trust or in education–students are being defrauded and worse.
I would also be betraying students like [deleted] and so many others to walk away from what I know is out-and-out fraud going on in the classroom and that is why they must have me gone because I will get even more evidence of it and take it to accreditation and other venues.
Here is some law that applies in this case and why I cannot be bought off and I actually regard this offer as a further attempt at Obstruction of Justice and Misprision of a Felony and an attempt to use public funds to get me to become an accomplice. Otherwise, I should be charged and convicted of false statements to law enforcement officers and attempting to use law enforcement for my own personal agenda–which I urged them to do if they thought I was either lying, playing games or attempting to use law enforcement and public resources for my own personal agenda.
Please see below why I cannot accept either a settlement or any “findings” that have the legitimacy of the findings of a nazi court against a Jew or a KKK courtroom against an African American… We can walk through my words word by word, comma, by comma, and they are all defensible, on-point, accurate, on union and pedagogical issues, on protected or supposedly protected venues for exchanges on critical issues for union members, and in the case of 7 days off and 8 days off there was not even a hearing or formal complaint.
Here is part of what I am being offered $100,000 of public monies to cover-up:
FROM A SWORN BRIEF SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION BY LISA LEWISON OF THE WEA: JAMES CRAVEN Vs. Clark College Grievant’s Closing Argument Lisa Lewison hereby submits her Closing Arguments on behalf of James Craven: I. INTRODUCTION On Thursday, November 3, 2010 and Friday, November 4, 2010, an arbitration took place on the Clark College Campus in Vancouver, Washington, involving Clark College (hereinafter “the College”) and the Clark College Association of Higher Education (hereinafter “the Association”). II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE The Association and the College stipulated to the following issue statement: “Did Clark College have just cause to impose a 108-day (2-term) suspension to Professor Craven? If no, what is the appropriate remedy?” NOTE: Lynn Davidson of the WEA and Dr. Marcia Roi of Clark College AHE both testified, under oath and penalty of perjury, for the second time in a second venue, the following:
“WEA-Riverside Director Lynn Davidson and AHE President, Dr. Marcia Roi testified to a labor management meeting they attended with President Bob Knight and Vice President Rassoul Dastmozd on Friday, November 9, 2007. AHE President Roi testified she told President Knight there was a “…morale problem on the campus.” President Knight responded “There is not a morale problem; morale will improve when we get rid of Professor Craven.” This was never refuted by management in the hearing. Ms. Davidson testified she was “shocked” President Bob Knight would say something like this to union representatives, and based on her expertise was troubled because his statements showed the union “should expect animosity by the President and the College in future dealings” related to Mr. Craven.
This testimony of Dr. Marcia Roi and Ms. Lynn Davidson, at the arbitration hearing subsequent to the ESD appeal hearing with ALJ Knutson, directly contradicts the sworn testimony of President Knight that he never made nor would ever make the statement “There is not a morale problem; morale will improve when we ‘get rid’ of Professor Craven” [Note Update: This testimony was again sworn under penalty of perjury for a second time in my recent termination hearing by both Lynn Davidson and Dr. Marcia Roi; This testimony from the transcript of Mr. Knight’s testimony in an ESD appeal hearing below was denied for a second time, in a second venue, under oath and penalty of perjury, by Mr. Knight in another official hearing (termination hearing). Now we do not simply have mutually contradictory sworn testimonies in different venues at different times, but now fundamentally opposing sworn testimonies in the same hearing on the same transcript and nothing was noted or reported to law enforcement (perjury by somebody plus derivate felonies from perjury in public employment while on official duties) by the hearing examiner (a former Kelso judge Mr. Stonier), nor by the AAG Ms Terada, nor by the WEA attorneys per their duties as Officers of the Court, Members of the Bar, a judicial officer acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Please note also, that for the fourth time, in four separate venues, Emma Kim, formerly of Clark College HR who refused to keep a secret file on me, testified to the following under oath and penalty of perjury:
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2003 2:38 AM
Subject: An insider’s view of the civil and employee rights violations at Clark College
Please add my voice to the e-Forum at Clark regarding the indoctrination process of Craven bashing. I think my unique insights can explain in part why so many of your colleagues, administration and staff suspend their critical thinking skills when you’re involved. The fact that most of your critics don’t know the history behind the administration’s fertilization efforts is indicative of how deeply rooted the indoctrination process is. Thanks in advance.
Date: February 12, 2003
To: Clark College Staff, Faculty, Staff, ASCC, Administration, Board, Foundation, Foundation Board, and THE INDEPENDENT
From: Emma Kim
RE: An insider’s perspective of your employee and civil rights as practiced by some administrators at Clark
Many of you will remember me. I worked in Personnel for Donna Kelly and Katrina Golder as their Office Assistant III from January 1997 to March 12, 1999. Several of you have asked me why I left the college. I’m prepared now to provide my answer.
For any employee who has felt like civil or employee rights were violated, you were probably right if Clark’s Personnel department was involved. If anyone has had their mental state questioned after speaking up or out about an issue at the college, your experience is not an isolated one. In fact, there are number of you who’ve had your mental states questioned. Based on my interviews, the common thread is not depression but practicing your freedom of speech to expose a problem at the college.
While I was employed in Personnel, I was privy to questionable hiring practices and privy to the deliberate violations of civil rights. For anyone who has not know what “human resources” functions as, consider what we as a society do to our natural resources and then you’ll have a pretty accurate context to determine your value relative to the power structure. As an HR Administrator, as I laid off 150 members of the workforce, I advised the employees that as a rule of thumb, smile at the HR people, get on their good side, but don’t trust most of them. That was based on my experience with the HR Managers in two Fortune 500 companies I worked for but mostly based on my experiences at Clark. The role of HR personnel is not to protect your rights but to protect the state or company from litigation if rights are violated. It is virtually impossible for any Personnel manager to know all the state and federal employment laws and their nuances, so employee rights are violated all the time. Let me give you specific examples from my two years at Clark. What I’m about to disclose may surprise you and create shifts in your thinking:
While I was an employee in Personnel, I was asked by Donna Kelly to engage in a task that involved the violation of Jim Craven’s civil and employee rights. The specific task was to send all his emails to the AG’s office. (Mind you, not Dennis Watson’s or anyone else’s emails, just Jim Craven’s stuff. For those of you who might be wondering what’s wrong with that, it is illegal to keep separate files on employees. It is also illegal to keep a separate file on anyone practicing their freedom of speech as a dissenter or activist.)
It is important for the reader to know what my filters were at the time when Donna tried to get me involved in violating his rights. I was highly critical, vocal in my criticism and fearful of Jim. I said and held many of the negative sentiments that I continue to hear on campus and continue to read and sense in print. After all, I trusted my new supervisors and coworkers when I was given the run down that Jim was litigious, slanderous, manipulative, a trouble maker, unreasonable, potentially violent and mean. I also asked about Dennis Watson since his emails were being distributed on the master list at the same time as Jim’s. Unlike with Jim, I was given an objective run down on Dennis, that he was caught with child pornography using state resources. There was no subjective demonization like, “Dennis is a creepy slime bag who will eyeball your underage children with a gleam in his eye.”
Equally important for the reader to know in order to understand that Craven bashing is an indoctrination process that all new employees go through as part of an informal orientation is how I felt about working in Personnel for Donna and Katrina. I thought I’d found two of the best bosses ever in my work history. Given those filters, I could see exactly what my department was talking about in Jim’s emails.
Blacklisting — Penalty.
Every person in this state who shall wilfully and maliciously, send or deliver, or make or cause to be made, for the purpose of being delivered or sent or part with the possession of any paper, letter or writing, with or without name signed thereto, or signed with a fictitious name, or with any letter, mark or other designation, or publish or cause to be published any statement for the purpose of preventing any other person from obtaining employment in this state or elsewhere, and every person who shall wilfully and maliciously “blacklist” or cause to be “blacklisted” any person or persons, by writing, printing or publishing, or causing the same to be done, the name, or mark, or designation representing the name of any person in any paper, pamphlet, circular or book, together with any statement concerning persons so named, or publish or cause to be published that any person is a member of any secret organization, for the purpose of preventing such person from securing employment, or who shall wilfully and maliciously make or issue any statement or paper that will tend to influence or prejudice the mind of any employer against the person of such person seeking employment, or any person who shall do any of the things mentioned in this section for the purpose of causing the discharge of any person employed by any railroad or other company, corporation, individual or individuals, shall, on conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than three hundred sixty-four days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. [2011 c 96 § 42; 1899 c 23 § 1; RRS § 7599.]
Findings — Intent — 2011 c 96: See note following RCW 9A.20.021.
Despite my own prejudices which were extreme by my own admission, I clearly understood that Jim’s rights were being violated by the very officer assigned to protect the college from discrimination and harassment. I refused and asked Donna why we were doing something we weren’t suppose to do to which she promptly replied with back peddling, “Oh, that’s okay. You don’t have to do it.” And that was the end of it, so I thought.
Shortly after my refusal to violate Jim’s rights, a central part of my duties that I performed for Donna was eliminated. While I had been privy to sensitive and private documents, all the tasks that included touching or seeing such documents such as copying, faxing, etc. were eliminated. Concerned that Donna had eliminated my job duties as a result of my refusal to violate Jim’s rights, I brought up the elimination of those duties to Katrina who reassured me that changes occurred “all the time.” I was confused and tried to make sense of what was going on. I felt conflicted about Donna. Was I working for an unethical person? How could I be? Donna was married to an African-American civil rights activist. No, maybe I was just making a mountain out of a molehill. Maybe, Katrina was right. Why would Donna violate Jim’s rights? No, way, she wouldn’t do that. She’s the AA/EO officer. These were some of the thoughts that ran through my mind as I tried to make sense of conflicting cues. Through the process of denial, I eventually rationalized that Donna’s intention was benevolent in trying to protect the college from Jim, so I let the issue go. After all, it was about Jim, the campus dreg.
But, the red flag kept bleeding. So, questions about Jim arose and I found myself asking why Jim was so angry, why he was so hell bent on thumping certain administrators. What was this guy all about? As I listened and watched I began to realize that there was more going on than what I’d originally been told. One of the things that seemed strange to me was that I hadn’t heard a single positive remark about Jim since I’d gotten hired. Even if an employee is not well liked, I have enough HR and supervisory experience to know that with critics, there are also supporters. So where were all of Jim’s supporters? I had not met a single supporter, not even amongst the tenured faculty. I had heard that Jim was well liked by students. But that confused the issue for me even more. Why did the students like Jim, but why did Clark’s employees detest him. The only thing I could do was watch and listen and read his emails thoughtfully.
In retrospect, it’s ironic that Donna’s action was what turned on my critical thinking circuitry and made me insatiably curious about what Jim Craven was all about. I was still vocally critical of Jim but given human nature, I feared my supervisors would think I was beginning to support him, so to alleviate any fear that I had subversive intentions, which I didn’t at the time, I told Donna and Katrina that I wanted to talk to Jim and get to know him. In my naiveté, I believed that these two very educated officers would appreciate the fact that I was up front with them and that I was taking initiative to gather information for myself rather than continuing to go on hearsay. After all, I worked in higher Ed where research and knowledge were supposed to be encouraged. Direct research is always better than with secondary or tertiary sources.
Neither discouraged me but each warned me to be careful. Donna reiterated that Jim could be very manipulative and that if given the opportunity, he would twist my statements and use them against me or the department. Given the Craven myths, I was still fearful that Jim would blow me me off as Donna’s and Katrina’s “whore” just because I worked for them. But, I also had enough information by then to offer Craven the benefit of doubt. So, the OAIII from personnel knocked on his office door one day and introduced herself. “Hi Professor Craven? My name is Emma Kim and I work for Donna Kelly and Katrina Golder….”
Since that introduction, Jim and I have become close friends. In fact, I frequently describe him as one of my best friends. I know his extended family and he knows my husband, mother and 13 year old niece, Berlin. He helps out where he can with a 13 year old “at-risk” youth who I mentor who is diagnosed with multiple disorders including ODD, bipolar affect disorder, and ADHD. I regret that I bought into the indoctrination because for two years, the opportunities for developing our friendship were wasted. For two years, the opportunity to expand my mind from the great books Jim’s turned me onto were wasted. For two years, the opportunity to expand my political knowledge from our numerous political discussions was wasted. But most importantly and significantly, Jim was denied the benefit of a supporter that could have made a difference in his life for two years. Clark’s administration is directly responsible. The waste cannot be measured because our friendship is priceless. I respect Jim so much and I can’t emphasize how troubled I am that so many of you continue to criticize him when most of you have never taken the time as I did to research and extrapolate the history of Jim’s troubles at Clark. I read numerous documents and interviewed dozens of people. Piece by piece, I put the jigsaw puzzle together and what the picture revealed was a systematic process the administration used to control dissenters. I’m writing to expose that pattern. It is one the ACLU, US Dept of Education, Civil Rights Division, WA Human Rights Commission and WA DOP is interested in. In fact, WA DOP stated to me unofficially that they were aware of a possible problem at Clark but that they didn’t have the resources to do anything unless the problem reached a certain level. I was encouraged by WA DOP to write a letter to GAAPCOM!!!!
For the reader, given the time and space factor, I am editing out a significant chunk of why I chose to leave the college. The following events took place after my refusal to violate Jim Craven’s civil rights. The significant facts are these:
We have emails from public records requests showing Mr Knight directing from the back-room, and has been the ring leader in initiating all various complaints against me (through proxies reward with public employment they were not properly hired and vetted for). Then Mr Knight became the “judge”, assessor of discipline and “appeal authority” on two of three possible levels of appeal against his “verdict” and “discipline assessed” on complaints he initiated and guided. Here is what brought a reprimand, assessed with no hearing or appeal, while off contract, for publishing on the message list (where cats and dogs are sold, etc) simply a list of statutes that all public employees should be aware of: From: Craven, Jim Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2009 2:22 PM To: Roi, Marcia; ‘firstname.lastname@example.org’ Subject: On denial of grievance on loss of pay This was central to the letter of reprimand and was not provided to me nor did I get a hearing as it was imposed while off contract. This was found in a public records request. Jim From: Dastmozd, Rassoul Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 11:02 AM To: Knight, Robert Cc: Kotsakis, Ted Subject: RE: [Messages] RCW (Criminal) for Public Employees (1) Hi Bob, I am working with ted to address this. Take care, Rassoul From: Knight, Robert Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 8:46 AM To: Dastmozd, Rassoul Cc: Kotsakis, Ted Subject: FW: [Messages] RCW (Criminal) for Public Employees (1) Rassoul, Each and everyone of these messages is a violation of our procedures and needs to be dealt with. Bob From: email@example.com [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org]On Behalf Of Craven, Jim Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 9:06 PM To: email@example.com Subject: [Messages] RCW (Criminal) for Public Employees (1)
|Trading in public office.|
(1) A person is guilty of trading in public office if: (a) He offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a public servant pursuant to an agreement or understanding that such actor will or may be appointed to a public office; or (b) Being a public servant, he requests, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit from another person pursuant to an agreement or understanding that such person will or may be appointed to a public office. (2) Trading in public office is a class C felony.
|RCW 9A.68.050Trading in special influence.|
(1) A person is guilty of trading in special influence if: (a) He offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon another person pursuant to an agreement or understanding that such other person will offer or confer a benefit upon a public servant or procure another to do so with intent thereby to secure or attempt to secure a particular result in a particular matter; or (b) He requests, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit pursuant to an agreement or understanding that he will offer or confer a benefit upon a public servant or procure another to do so with intent thereby to secure or attempt to secure a particular result in a particular matter. (2) Trading in special influence is a class C felony.
Every public officer who shall knowingly make any false or misleading statement in any official report or statement, under circumstances not otherwise prohibited by law, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor. [1909 c 249 § 98; RRS § 2350.]
|RCW 42.20.080Other violations by officers.|
Every officer or other person mentioned in RCW42.20.070, who shall wilfully disobey any provision of law regulating his official conduct in cases other than those specified in said section, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor. 42.20.090 << 42.20.100 >> 42.20.110
|RCW 42.20.100Failure of duty by public officer a misdemeanor.|
Whenever any duty is enjoined by law upon any public officer or other person holding any public trust or employment, their wilful neglect to perform such duty, except where otherwise specially provided for, shall be a misdemeanor. [1909 c 249 § 16; RRS § 2268. Prior: Code 1881 § 889; 1854 p 90 § 82.]
The following definitions are applicable in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires: (1) “Materially false statement” means any false statement oral or written, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding; whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law; (2) “Oath” includes an affirmation and every other mode authorized by law of attesting to the truth of that which is stated; in this chapter, written statements shall be treated as if made under oath if: (a) The statement was made on or pursuant to instructions on an official form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable; (b) The statement recites that it was made under oath, the declarant was aware of such recitation at the time he or she made the statement, intended that the statement should be represented as a sworn statement, and the statement was in fact so represented by its delivery or utterance with the signed jurat of an officer authorized to administer oaths appended thereto; or (c) It is a statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, made within or outside the state of Washington, which is certified or declared to be true under penalty of perjury as provided in RCW9A.72.085. (3) An oath is “required or authorized by law” when the use of the oath is specifically provided for by statute or regulatory provision or when the oath is administered by a person authorized by state or federal law to administer oaths; (4) “Official proceeding” means a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other government agency or official authorized to hear evidence under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking testimony or depositions; (5) “Juror” means any person who is a member of any jury, including a grand jury, impaneled by any court of this state or by any public servant authorized by law to impanel a jury; the term juror also includes any person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror; (6) “Testimony” includes oral or written statements, documents, or any other material that may be offered by a witness in an official proceeding. [2001 c 171 § 2. Prior: 1995 c 285 § 30; 1981 c 187 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 §9A.72.010.] Notes: 9A.72.010 << 9A.72.020 >> 9A.72.030
|Intimidating a witness.|
(1) A person is guilty of intimidating a witness if a person, by use of a threat against a current or prospective witness, attempts to: (a) Influence the testimony of that person; (b) Induce that person to elude legal process summoning him or her to testify; (c) Induce that person to absent himself or herself from such proceedings; or (d) Induce that person not to report the information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child, not to have the crime or the abuse or neglect of a minor child prosecuted, or not to give truthful or complete information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child. (2) A person also is guilty of intimidating a witness if the person directs a threat to a former witness because of the witness’s role in an official proceeding. (3) As used in this section: (a) “Threat” means: (i) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or (ii) Threat as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(25). (b) “Current or prospective witness” means: (i) A person endorsed as a witness in an official proceeding; (ii) A person whom the actor believes may be called as a witness in any official proceeding; or (iii) A person whom the actor has reason to believe may have information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child. (c) “Former witness” means: (i) A person who testified in an official proceeding; (ii) A person who was endorsed as a witness in an official proceeding; (iii) A person whom the actor knew or believed may have been called as a witness if a hearing or trial had been held; or (iv) A person whom the actor knew or believed may have provided information related to a criminal investigation or an investigation into the abuse or neglect of a minor child. (4) Intimidating a witness is a class B felony. [1997 c 29 § 1; 1994 c 271 § 204; 1985 c 327 § 2; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 18; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 §9A.72.110.] Notes:
|*Reviser’s note: RCW9A.04.110 was amended by 2005 c 458 § 3, changing subsection (25) to subsection (26); and was subsequently amended by 2007 c 79 § 3, changing subsection (26) to subsection (27).Finding — 1994 c 271: See note following RCW9A.72.090. Purpose — Severability — 1994 c 271: See notes following RCW9A.28.020.|
|RCW 9A.72.150Tampering with physical evidence.|
(1) A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence if, having reason to believe that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted and acting without legal right or authority, he: (a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters physical evidence with intent to impair its appearance, character, or availability in such pending or prospective official proceeding; or (b) Knowingly presents or offers any false physical evidence. (2) “Physical evidence” as used in this section includes any article, object, document, record, or other thing of physical substance. (3) Tampering with physical evidence is a gross misdemeanor.
|RCW 9A.76.175Making a false or misleading statement to a public servant.|
A person who knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. “Material statement” means a written or oral statement reasonably likely to be relied upon by a public servant in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties. [2001 c 308 § 2. Prior: 1995 c 285 § 32.] Notes:
|Purpose — 2001 c 308: “The purpose of this act is to respond toState v. Thomas, 103 Wn. App. 800, by reenacting, without changes, the law prohibiting materially false or misleading statements to public servants, enacted as sections 32 and 33, chapter 285, Laws of 1995.” [2001 c 308 § 1.]Effective date — 2001 c 308: “This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [May 14, 2001].” [2001 c 308 § 4.] Effective date — 1995 c 285: See RCW48.30A.900.|
|RCW 9A.76.180Intimidating a public servant.|
(1) A person is guilty of intimidating a public servant if, by use of a threat, he attempts to influence a public servant’s vote, opinion, decision, or other official action as a public servant. (2) For purposes of this section “public servant” shall not include jurors. (3) “Threat” as used in this section means (a) to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or (b) threats as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(25). (4) Intimidating a public servant is a class B felony. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 §9A.76.180.] Notes:
|*Reviser’s note: RCW9A.04.110 was amended by 2005 c 458 § 3, changing subsection (25) to subsection (26); and was subsequently amended by 2007 c 79 § 3, changing subsection (26) to subsection (27).|
|RCW 9A.80.010Official misconduct.|
(1) A public servant is guilty of official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit or to deprive another person of a lawful right or privilege: (a) He intentionally commits an unauthorized act under color of law; or (b) He intentionally refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law. (2) Official misconduct is a gross misdemeanor. [1975-’76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 17; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 §9A.80.010.] Notes:
|Effective date — Severability — 1975-’76 2nd ex.s. c 38:See notes following RCW 9A.08.020.Failure of duty by public officers: RCW42.20.100.|
Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter. (1) “Unlawful harassment” means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or, when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of their child. (2) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. “Course of conduct” includes, in addition to any other form of communication, contact, or conduct, the sending of an electronic communication. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.” [2001 c 260 § 2; 1999 c 27 § 4; 1995 c 127 § 1; 1987 c 280 § 2.] Notes:
|Findings — Intent — 2001 c 260: “The legislature finds that unlawful harassment directed at a child by a person under the age of eighteen is not acceptable and can have serious consequences. The legislature further finds that some interactions between minors, such as “schoolyard scuffles,” though not to be condoned, may not rise to the level of unlawful harassment. It is the intent of the legislature that a protection order sought by the parent or guardian of a child as provided for in this chapter be available only when the alleged behavior of the person under the age of eighteen to be restrained rises to the level set forth in chapter 10.14 RCW.” [2001 c 260 § 1.]Intent — 1999 c 27: See note following RCW9A.46.020.|
|RCW 10.14.190Constitutional rights.|
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to infringe upon any constitutionally protected rights including, but not limited to, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. [1987 c 280 § 19.] VERSUS THIS SWORN TESTIMONY OF CLARK COLLEGE PRESIDENT ROBERT KNIGHT: LISA LEWISON’S BRIEF CONTINUES:
The federal offense of failure to disclose a felony, if coupled with some act concealing the felony, such as suppression of evidence, harboring or protecting the person performing the felony, intimidation or harming a witness, or any other act designed to conceal from authorities the fact that a crime has been committed.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 4. Misprision of felony. Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
A federal judge, or any other government official, is required as part of the judge’s mandatory administrative duties, to receive any offer of information of a federal crime. If that judge blocks such report, that block is a felony under related obstruction of justice statutes, and constitutes a serious offense.
Upon receiving such information, the judge is then required to make it known to agovernment law enforcement body that is not themselves involved in the federal crime.
Another Federal Statute for Forcing A Federal Officer To Perform a Mandatory DutyAnother federal statute exists for reporting high-level corruption in government:
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
This federal statute permits any citizen to file a lawsuit in the federal courts to obtain a court order requiring a federal official to perform a mandatory duty and to halt unlawful acts. This statute is Title 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
These two statutes are among the most powerful tools in the hands of the people, even a single person, to report corrupt and criminal activities by federal officials−including federal judges−and to circumvent the blocks by those in key positions in the three branches of government. That statute was also repeatedly blocked by federal judges and Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
18 U.S. Code Chapter 13 – CIVIL RIGHTS
8 U.S. Code Chapter 73 – OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
- § 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees
- § 1510. Obstruction of criminal investigations
- § 1511. Obstruction of State or local law enforcement
- § 1512. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant
- § 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant
- § 1514. Civil action to restrain harassment of a victim or witness
- § 1514A. Civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud cases
- § 1515. Definitions for certain provisions; general provision
(1) A public servant is guilty of official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit or to deprive another person of a lawful right or privilege:
(a) He intentionally commits an unauthorized act under color of law; or
(b) He intentionally refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law.
(2) Official misconduct is a gross misdemeanor.
[1975-’76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 17; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.80.010.]
Every public officer who shall knowingly make any false or misleading statement in any official report or statement, under circumstances not otherwise prohibited by law, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
[1909 c 249 § 98; RRS § 2350.]
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Right to disclose improper governmental actions — Interference prohibited.
(1) An employee shall not directly or indirectly use or attempt to use the employee’s official authority or influence for the purpose of intimidating, threatening, coercing, commanding, influencing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, coerce, command, or influence any individual for the purpose of interfering with the right of the individual to: (a) Disclose to the auditor (or representative thereof) information concerning improper governmental action; or (b) identify rules warranting review or provide information to the rules review committee.
(2) Nothing in this section authorizes an individual to disclose information otherwise prohibited by law.
[1995 c 403 § 510; 1989 c 284 § 2; 1982 c 208 § 3.]
Retaliatory action against whistleblower — Remedies.
(1) Any person who is a whistleblower, as defined in RCW 42.40.020, and who has been subjected to workplace reprisal or retaliatory action is presumed to have established a cause of action for the remedies provided under chapter 49.60 RCW. For the purpose of this section “reprisal or retaliatory action” means but is not limited to any of the following:
(a) Denial of adequate staff to perform duties;
(b) Frequent staff changes;
(c) Frequent and undesirable office changes;
(d) Refusal to assign meaningful work;
(e) Unwarranted and unsubstantiated letters of reprimand or unsatisfactory performance evaluations;
(g ) Reduction in pay;
(h) Denial of promotion;
(k) Denial of employment;
(l) A supervisor or superior encouraging coworkers to behave in a hostile manner toward the whistleblower; and
(m) A change in the physical location of the employee’s workplace or a change in the basic nature of the employee’s job, if either are in opposition to the employee’s expressed wish.
(2) The agency presumed to have taken retaliatory action under subsection (1) of this section may rebut that presumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency action or actions were justified by reasons unrelated to the employee’s status as a whistleblower.
(3) Nothing in this section prohibits an agency from making any decision exercising its authority to terminate, suspend, or discipline an employee who engages in workplace reprisal or retaliatory action against a whistleblower. However, the agency also shall implement any order under chapter 49.60 RCW (other than an order of suspension if the agency has terminated the retaliator).
[1999 c 283 § 1; 1992 c 118 § 3; 1989 c 284 § 4; 1982 c 208 § 5.]